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(U) Contrary to the Air Force's claim that its BOMARC missile would have greater growth potential than the HERCULES, it was the HERCULES, rather than the BOMARC, that truly exhibited the capability of keeping pace with the changing air threat without the need for developing a brand new weapon. The BOMARC A missile, which was in final development during the 1958-59 controversy, was phased out as a tactical weapon in the mid-1960's and replaced by the new BOMARC B missile whose launching and control operation was still dependent on the expensive SAGE system and whose altitude was still limited by its liquid propulsion system.1 In contrast, the Basic HERCULES missile and launching area equipment, which reached the field in 1958, was still in tactical use 14 years later, and the basic ground guidance and control equipment had been progressively updated to meet the advancing air threat through a series of field modifications. Indeed, modification kits for the first such improvement were already in production at the time of the HERCULES-BOMARC controversy, and the first tactical Basic HERCULES battery was retrofitted in June 1961, the scheduled combat readiness date of the first BOMARC system.

Program Philosophy and Military Requirements

(U) The peculiarities of air defense weapons, in general, and the NIKE HERCULES, in particular, dictated a radical departure from the usual policies governing engineering efforts following basic system deployment and cessation of major production. Most land-based weapons can be said never to lose their complete effectiveness, because their primary targets do not change appreciably. For example, a World War II artillery piece can still perform its major function; a REDSTONE or CORPORAL missile, however cumbersome to operate, may still destroy an enemy installation; and an obsolete rifle served to slay a President of the United States. In the case of a complex, electronically controlled air defense weapon, however, a breakthrough in countermeasure technology or even a major improvement in aircraft or countermeasure techniques may render the system completely ineffective. It is, therefore, never feasible to freeze the design of an air defense system until its imminent replacement by a follow-on system is assured. Moreover, research and development of system improvements to stay abreast of the state of the art must be undertaken as a parallel effort with the basic program, so that tactical hardware will be available to cope with the new threats as they materialize.

(U) In recognition of these factors, DA established requirements for the HERCULES improvement program at the very outset of basic system development in 1954. Guidance for the conduct of the NIKE program, set forth in a directive to OCO on 23 October 1954, stated:

. . . Concurrent with the prosecution of the NIKE I and NIKE B programs, studies and research and development must be conducted to insure that the NIKE equipment is modernized to the maximum extent within the limits of current technology and economics of improvement as compared to investment in a new system. . . .

Specific guidelines adopted for the program called for studies and research and development dealing with (1) targets to be expected in the 1960-1970 timeframe and means of improving system performance against these targets; (2) modifications required to improve the effectiveness of the basic system against low-altitude targets and against formations without the use of atomic warheads; and (3) improvements in kill effectiveness and target traffic handling ability.2

Feasibility Studies

(U) Early in 1955, just as the Basic HERCULES missile development flight tests began, BTL initiated a research study to determine the feasibility and practicability of providing a fundamentally improved antiaircraft system. Using this research and experimental work as a point of departure, BTL, in early 1956, re-examined the HERCULES system capabilities and made a detailed study of the precise modifications required to obtain adequate performance against the predicted threat of the 1960-65 period. In general, the expected threat centered around manned and unmanned aerodynamically supported vehicles, varying from comparatively large to very small radar cross sections and having velocities up to Mach 3 or more and large electronic countermeasure (ECM) capabilities. The Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) also posed a threat; however, earlier studies indicated that it was undesirable to modify the HERCULES to combat these, because only limited capability could be obtained at a relatively high cost. Moreover, the third-generation NIKE ZEUS system was commissioned to solve this problem. The HERCULES improvement studies, therefore, were directed primarily at targets with high levels of ECM and at aerodynamically supported missiles and aircraft.

(U) To achieve a system for defense against these targets, BTL proposed to develop vastly improved ground guidance and central equipment which would be employed with the Basic HERCULES missile. Essentially, three significant improvements were proposed to give the Improved HERCULES system the required threat handling capability. They were (1) the addition of a new L-band High Power Acquisition Radar (HIPAR) to detect small, high-speed, non-ballistic targets; (2) improvements to the existing X-band TTR to increase range performance; and (3) the addition of a Target Ranging Radar (TRR) operating in a very wide, fairly new frequency band to provide range information in a heavy ECM environment. The HIPAR and improved X-band TTR would extend the detection and tracking range of the system, thereby allowing sufficient time to achieve the required number of intercepts against the small cross section, high-speed threat. The new TRR would be slaved to the target tracking radar and have the function of providing target range information when the range-determining ability of the TTR was impaired by enemy electronic countermeasures. The development of a seeker-equipped missile was considered as a means of improving performance against low-flying aircraft at long ranges; however, this improvement was not adopted because of time and cost factors.3

(U) Since the proposed program was an improvement to the Basic HERCULES system, with changes confined to the ground guidance area, no detailed MC's were prepared. Instead, CONARC

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and ARADCOM both concurred in BTL's feasibility study on the improved equipment; and DA approved the proposed development program following a BTL presentation on 24 August 1956.4

The Improved HERCULES System

(U) In developing the Improved NIKE HERCULES system, which constituted the first of several phases of the improvement program, the WECo-BTL ream capitalized on the inherent growth potential of the basic system by adding to it the aforementioned new and modified ground guidance equipment to increase its capabilities. This equipment was to be supplied in the form of modification kits which could be applied either to systems in production or to field-emplaced batteries with a minimum of down time. The plan was to procure one set of modification kits for each basic tactical system and one set for each four non-tactical systems. The program was implemented as shown in Chart 12.

{Chart 12 is not included in the Freedom of Information document.}

(U) WECo continued HERCULES development under the basic R6D contract (ORD-1082) until 1 June 1963, when this contract was replaced by DA-30-069-AMC-189 (Z). Except for the addition of the General Electric Company as the principal subcontractor for the new L-band HIPAR, the contractor structure remained essentially unchanged (see Chart 13). The only new facilities required for the manufacture of improved equipment consisted of a $5 million expansion of the Tarheel Ordnance Plant for production of magnetron tubes.5

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Development and Production

(U) The engineering design of the improved equipment was completed in FY 1957 and the R&D drawings were released in 1958 for the procurement of one prototype set for use in the R&D test program. As stated earlier, this prototype equipment was produced under a supplement to WECo's Contract ORD-1447 at a cost of $6,771.500.6 The improvement kit was classified as Limited Production (LP) in May 1959.7 and the classification was renewed thereafter until FY 1964. when the kit became Standard A.8

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Prototype Evaluation Tests

(U) In 1959, BTL conducted tracking tests of the prototype equipment at its Whippany plant, using a rented propeller-driven aircraft as a target. These experiments ended on 11 December, with a series of tests to check the instrumentation performance of the improved system. By the end of 1959, the HIPAR antenna and radar units had been installed at WSMR Area 3 and power-on tests were in progress preparatory to the upcoming evaluation flight tests.ll

(U) Final checkout and tracking tests began st WSMR early in 1960. The prototype system was transferred to Government control on 31 March and the test program continued as a joint responsibility of Ordnance and the user, under BTL's direction. In accordance with the test plan (AOMC TP-5), arrangements were made for flight tests to exercise the improved system in all principal modes of operation against the highest performance targets available. Among these were engagements of HERCULES target missiles fired from the ZEUS Uprange Facility (ZURF). Located at Stallion Site about 90 nautical miles uprange from WSMR Area 3, this installation included a Basic HERCULES system modified to provide improved guidance control for the BERCULES target missiles. On 18 March 1960, Army personnel fired an AJAX missile in a successful test of ZURF. This was followed, on 8 April 1960, by the firing of a HERCULES missile from ZURF in a successful tracking and acquisition test of the defending Improved HERCULES system at WSMR Area 3. The enemy HERCULES missile was observed by the HIPAR and successfully tracked by the target tracking radar throughout the mission.12

(U) Evaluation of the Improved HERCULES prototype system, using a production model of the basic launching and handling equipment, began at WSMR on 14 April 1960 and continued through 13 April 1961. Nineteen firing tests (17 HERCULES and 2 AJAX) were performed during the evaluation, 16 of which were fully successful and two qualified successes (intercept precluded by target malfunction). The one unsuccessful test was marred by missile beacon failure. Military personnel shared key operator positions with contractor personnel in all of the firings and throughout the tracking and electronic counter-countermeasure (ECM) tests. This efficient operator team contributed greatly to the success of the test program.13

(U) Beginning the prototype evaluation, the test crew fired two NIKE AJAX rounds in April 1960. the first at a space point and the other at a jet-powered XM-21 drone. Both firings were fully successful, with radial miss distances of 14 yards and 18 yards, respectively. The XM-21 drone--the first live target engaged by the Improved HERCULES equipment-was destroyed. The first HERCULES firing from the improved system, on 1 June 1960, was a prove-in round at a space point target. The hypothetical target was successfully intercepted at intermediate range and altitude with a radial miss distance of only 15 yards, thus confirming the HERCULES mode of operation.14

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{page 173 - a Xerox of a printed picture of a Hercules, a CORPORAL, and a sequence of unrecognizable intercept images is not reproduced here. Much better images are widely available on the WWW. Caption under images is}

(U) FIRST MISSILE KILLED BY A MISSILE--Traveling at thousands of miles an hour, a NIKE HERCULES guided missile (left) tracked and shot down a CORPORAL ballistic missile (right) high over the WSMR. 3 June 1960. Picture sequence in center shows destruction of the target. This test marked the first time for a missile to be killed by a missile, and it was the first involving the NIKE HERCULES. Earlier in the year, a HAWK guided missile had shot down an HONEST JOHN, a short-range unguided rocket. (WSMR Photo, 3 June 1960)

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(U) In the last two HERCULES-versus-HERCULES tests (INH-12 and INH-14), the unaugmented target missiles were programmed on shallow, semiballistic trajectories. System performance was flawless throughout the first test; however, the target malfunctioned 5 seconds before intercept. The second test was nullified when internal failsafe action destroyed the defending missile. This missile malfunction (loss of beacon signal) was the only failure of the entire prototype evaluation firing program.l8

(U) The remaining eight prototype tests, all successful, consisted of (1) the interception and destruction of a highaltitude POGO-HI (rocket-launched parachute target); (2) the detection and interception of an air-launched, Mach-3 Q-5 target drone of small radar cross section; (3) two firings in the surface-to-surface mode; (4) intercepts of a jet-powered XM-21 and a Q-2 drone in the low-altitude mode; and (5) two demonstrations of system performance against ECM aircraft.l9 (See Table 15.)

System Description

(U) The Improved HERCULES consisted of the standard (Basic) HERCULES system augmented by two new radars (the HIPAR and TRR) and the modified standard TTR to enhance the system's target acquisition and ECM capabilities. In effect, these advanced radars extended the reach of the powerful HERCULES missile, permitting multiple intercepts against advanced ECM aircraft and small high-performance missiles.

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(U) The trailer-mounted target ranging radar was added to the improved system to aid in tracking targets when the enemy employed modern ECM equipment. Operating in the Ku frequency band, it could totally defeat X-band jamming of the target tracking radar. Under X-band jamming conditions, the TTR tracked the jamming signal and continuously provided the system with target angle data; while the TRR, angle-slaved to the TPR, supplied target range information. The Ku band was chosen for TRR operation chiefly because it was relatively unused in radar systems and consequently added to the Improved HERCULES' ECCM advantage. That is, an enemy's logistical requirement was again compounded by the amount of equipment needed to generate the wide-bead level signals to jam these frequencies. Even if the system were subjected to Ku band interference, the TRR operator could readily tune around the jamming signal by means of a panoramic receiver display and two independently operating transmitter-receiver systems, one operating on the air and the other into a wave-guide system in a standby status. With the introduction of the K, band, four operating frequency bands were used by the Improved HERCULES radars, each having frequency diversity within its own band. The fact



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that an enemy would be over-burdened with jamming equipment effectively to encompass these bands was an innate advantage held by the Improved HERCULES system.

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(U) Also in the Improved HERCULES system were two new electronic displays to aid in the acquisition of small, high-speed targets by reducing the reaction time of the operation. One of these displays was an R-scope that expanded the range-sweep presentation to aid in detecting and gating the target video. The other was a B-scope, which showed an enlarged segment (target area) of the PPI presentation.22

{page 184 - a Xerox of a printed picture of some unrecognizable domes is not reproduced here. Caption under images is "Major Items of the Improved HERCULES System (left to right): LOPAR, TTR, MTR, TRR, and (Fixed) HIPAR.")

Training and Deployment

(U) New Equipment Training Courses on operation and maintenance of the HIPAR and TRR were conducted under supervision of ARGMA during the period November 1959 to August 1960. The General Electric Company conducted six 6-week classes on the HIPAR at Syracuse, New York, with 96 key personnel completing the course. Field engineers of WECo trained 102 key personnel in operation and maintenance of the TRR in four 4-week classes at ARGMA.23 WECo also conducted four 2-week classes on the Improved Type IV test equipment at OGMS during the period 20 March to 12 May 1961, with 120 personnel completing the course.24

(U) Early in 1961, Improved HERCULES kits were installed at OGMS and the Army Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas, for use in resident training courses for Ordnance and user personnel required to support the initial tactical sites. Unit training began in May 1961, when the first system with HIPAR was turned over to the user at Fort Bliss.25

(U) The deployment concept for the Improved HERCULES was developed during FY 1959 in a limited war game conducted at the Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, using the Remington Rand 1103-A computer. This war game was played for nine city defenses, which had from four to 25 Basic HERCULES batteries. Initially, if was assumed that none of the HERCULES batteries was improved. Then, increasing numbers of complete improved systems were added to the defense. The results of the game indicated that each added kit gave an increasing increment of effectiveness, making it desirable to retrofit as many of the batteries as possible. However, budget limitations for air defense and the requirements for other missile systems within the same timeframe made it unrealistic to retrofit all HERCULES batteries. The guidelines thus adopted for providing the minimum acceptable improvement in defense called for one complete retrofit kit for each group of three fire units in defenses having 12 or more units, and for each group of two fire units in defenses having less than 12 units. The Basic HERCULES batteries not receiving a complete improvement kit would receive all components of the system except the HIPAR, or a so-called partial system.

(U) In applying these guidelines to specific defense areas, several restrictions had to be considered. First, some batteries employed the AJAX missile system, there were no plans for converting these to HERCULES, and it was obviously impossible to apply an Improved HERCULES to an AJAX battery. Second, there were double HERCULES batteries in some defenses (i.e., two batteries in the same location) and it was not considered appropriate to apply complete improved systems to both halves of these double batteries. Third, the configuration and size of some sites were such that they would not readily accommodate an Improved HERCULES system. Finally, it was essential that improved systems with HIPAR be located as far as possible from existing or planned Air Force frequency diversity radars, in order to avoid unnecessary duplication and to eliminate radar interference. Hence, the makeup of an individual tactical site or defense area conceivably could consist of a mix of some or all of the NIKE systems--the AJAX, the Basic HERCULES, the Basic HERCULES retrofitted with the complete improvement kit, and/or the Basic HERCULES system with a partial improvement kit (i.e. all components except the HIPAR).26 A typical AJAX-HERCULES mix in a metropolitan defense area is illustrated in the accompanying layout.


(U) Deployment of the Improved HERCULES began in June 1961 and continued into FY 1968, with the Improved EFS/ATBM* HIPAR modification being phased in during 1963. Deployments to CONUS sites started on 10 June 1961, when the first complete improvement kit was delivered, installed, and accepted by Ordnance at Site BA-30 in the Washington-Baltimore defense area.27 The installation of complete kits in tactical units overseas commenced during 1962. The first system went to Taiwan and became operational on 7 December 1962.28 Deployments to MAP countries (Europe) began early in 1963, the first system being installed at a site in Denmark during the period 1 February to 15 April 1963. Equipment of the last tactical Basic HERCULES battery was updated in September 1967.30

Phaseout of the NIKE AJAX System

(U) Meanwhile, the NIKE AJAX missile system was phased out from all CONUS sites in May 1964, after a full decade of active air defense service. The final phaseout of the AJAX from CONUS defense areas began early in FY 1962, with deployment of the first Improved HERCULES systems. Many of the original AJAX sires had been converted to the Basic BERCULES after it became operational in mid-1958, and those remaining were operated by the National Guard. These CONUS sites, when inactivated, were either converted to HERCULES or retained for possible future use.31

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(U) The NIKE AJAX system (less launcher) had been reclassified from Standard A to Standard B in mid-1958, concurrently with deployment of the Basic HERCULES system. The AJAX launcher became Standard B in December 1958.33 Effective 6 April 1965, all components of the AJAX system were declared obsolete except the missile and missile handling, servicing, and test equipment, which were retained as Standard B to meet continued MAP support requirements. At that time, there were six nontactical AJAX systems at Fort Bliss: three for use in integration training by the First Air Defense Guided Missile Brigade; two for use by the Air Defense Board as test bed systems; and one on display at the Army Air Defense School. Fort Bliss requisitioned repair parts covering the retention timeframe for these systems, thereby permitting the system to be classified as obsolete, allowing for the disposal of inventory not required, and eliminating some 3,000 items from the Federal Supply System.34

The Improved HERCULES ATBM System

(U) Realizing that advanced guided missile systems such as the Improved HERCULES would inevitably lead to enemy counter developments, DA again exploited the proven growth potential of the HERCULES to keep abreast of the advancing air threat. Aside from retrofitting the HIPAR and LOPAR with the Anti-Jam Display, as noted earlier, the WECo-BTL team developed and produced major modifications to extend radar surveillance and tracking capabilities, the advantage held over ECM, and tactical operability of the system. Chief among these improvements were the ATBM and EFS HIPAR modifications.

(U) The Improved HERCULES ATBM modification was developed during the 1960-62 period to provide the field army an interim defense against the short-range ballistic missile threat.35 The requirement for such a weapon, which had been projected by the War Department Equipment Board as early as May 1946, became a reality early in 1959, when reliable intelligence reports indicated that the Soviet Union possessed a significant short- and long-range tactical ballistic missile and rocket capability that could be employed against a field army. Judging from past technological developments, there was no reason to doubt that this capability would become increasingly extensive in the course of the next decade. The Army Field Forces, in 1951, had established MC's for an antimissile missile (AMM) defense system to meet "long-term requirements" of the field army, and the first attempt to develop such a weapon had begun under the Ordnance Corps' PLATO project in 1952. however, work on the PLATO was ordered terminated in February 1959, before completion of component development.36 To satisfy the requirement for a weapon to counter the newly defined tactical ballistic missile threat in the 1960-1970 period, DA then established a program for development of the Field Army Ballistic Missile Defense System (FABMDS). Since this system was not expected to be operational until 1967 at the earliest, the Army, in 1960, decided to develop the Improved HERCULES ATBM system as an interim measure to fill the gap.37

(U) The ATBM study, conducted by BTL during the first quarter of CY 1960, took into consideration the Improved HERCULES' capability against such missiles and rockets as the REDSTONE, SERGEANT, CORPORAL, Missile B (now the LANCE), HONEST JOHN, LITTLEJOHN, and LACROSSE. The REDSTONE-type missile was considered to be the highest performance missile against which the HERCULES ATBM system could defend any practical land area. Further extension of ATBM system capabilities would require extensive redesign approaching the use of the NIKZ ZEUS techniques. BTL engineers felt that such a program would be economically unfeasible and would doubtlessly entail a development timeframe approaching that of FABMDS itself.

(U) The primary objective thus established for the HERCULES ATBM system was to defend the field army against as great a portion of the 1960-1970 threat as timely and economically feasible modifications to the Improved HERCULES would permit. The HERCULES ATBM system was not intended to satisfy all objectives of the FABMDS, to serve as a substitute for it, or to render its development any less essential. It was intended, rather, to fill a critical field army defense requirement with a weapon system that capitalized upon an extension of proven ATBM capability, existing production facilities, the existence of personnel trained in its use, and established logistic channels. This approach permitted the development of a potent weapon for interim use at minimum cost and in a minimum period of time.38

(U) The ATBM system, as such, was an Improved HERCULES system with modifications. Of particular significance were modifications to the HIPAR antenna, giving extended high-altitude coverage, and the introduction of a new Battery Control Console, with faster target transfer hardware and dual PPI's for long- and short-range presentations, as well as designate controls. The computer was also codified to incorporate within it a ballistic prediction function. Concurrently with the ATBM modifications, HIPAR capabilities of the system were extended in a major redesign program to include Electronic Frequency Selection (EFS) for improved ECM. With the original HIPAR, frequency change was done by mechanical means from autotune units and required 30 seconds to complete the operation, during which there was a loss of information. With the EFS modification, tuning could be accomplished in 20 microseconds.

(U) Prototype ATBM and EFS HIPAR modification kits were installed in the Improved HERCULES system at WSMR during the latter part of 1962, and integrated engineering-service tests began in April 1963. Target missiles used in the ATBM performance evaluation consisted of the HERCULES, REDSTONE, SERGEANT, HONEST JOHN, and PERSHING. The HERCULES missile, with its steep trajectory and relatively low and varying radar cross section, did not present a realistic target. However, in a number of firings from the ZURF facility during the period 3 April to 5 September 1963, it was used as a training vehicle for developing operator proficiency against a ballistic target, and also as a target to test computer modifications.40

(U) The PERSHING represented a target beyond the design capability of the ATBM system. In a test conducted on 16 October 1963, it was successfully acquired but not tracked. The REDSTONE, with its separating characteristics, did not fully fall within the expected enemy tactical ballistic missile (TBM) threat spectrum. There were two ATBM evaluation firings against the REDSTONE: one on 23 September and the other on 5 October 1963. In the first one, the target video was lost about 10 seconds before planned intercept. In the second firing, the target was successfully acquired and tracked, but an offset of 2,000 yards inadvertently placed by the operator precluded a ki11.41

(U) Meanwhile, WECo began new/modified equipment training classes at OGMS in October 1962.44 Field installation of the Improved HERCULES EFS/ATBM equipment commenced in 1963, overlapping deployments of the basic Improved HERCULES. Installation of the first production EFS HIPAR, less the ATBM capability, started in CONUS at Site NY-56 in February 1963 and was completed on 20 April 1963. During this initial installation, ARADCOM determined that CONUS HIPAR's would not be equipped with the ATBM antenna or the dual PPI console in their existing design.45 Final checkout of the first tactical EFS/ATBM system was completed the week of 21 July 1963, and the system was turned over to the U.S. Army, Alaska, on 25 July--5 days earlier than scheduled.46 The HIPAR/EFS retrofit program started in November 1963 and continued into the second half of FY 1965.47

The Mobile HIPAR Program

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(U) The GOER vehicle, designed by the Army Tank-Automotive Command, met the basic requirements, and CONARC drafted the MC's for a GOER-mounted system in November 1961, following a study of the problem by BTL. Work on the GOER HLPAR mobility program began in March 1962 and continued until December 1962, when the Office, Chief of Research and Development (OCRD) directed that it be suspended in favor of an approach more adaptable to air mobility. The HERCULES Project Manager then reoriented the program, falling back on an earlier less mobile concept which envisioned the use of modified standard trailers and M52 truck tractors. The proposed alternate program for mobilizing the HIPAR equipment was presented to OCRD on 18 December 1962 and distributed to all interested agencies in February 1963. It consisted of six dropbed semitrailers: four to transport HIPAR electronic equipment in vans, one to carry the antenna, and one to carry the engine-driven power generators.49

(U) Work on the alternate system commenced with OCRD approval of the Technical Development Plan on 5 June 1963. The General Electric Company developed the Mobile HIPAR under subcontract to BTL and in conjunction with the Army Tank-Automotive Command. An acceptance inspection review of the complete R&D prototype was held on 11 February 1964 at the contractor's plant in Syracuse, New York. At this review, representatives of interested commands and using agencies witnessed a demonstration of the R&D prototype, in which the six-trailer system was successfully march ordered in 1 hour and 13 minutes and emplaced in 1 hour and 43 minutes--well within the period required for the Improved HERCULFS (without HIPAR) with mobility kit. Development was completed on 28 February 1964, when the R&D model was delivered via road march from Syracuse, Mew York, to Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Maryland. Having passed the mobility test at APG without degradation of system electronic components, the R&D model was shipped by rail to WSMR on 1 July 1964. Upon completion of engineering rests at WSMR, the R&D prototype was turned over to the Army Air Defense Board on 23 September 1964 for service tests.50

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(U) The AN/MPQ-43 Mobile HIPAR was classified Standard A in August 1966. At the same time, the contractor delivered the first production unit and confirmatory tests were completed 4 months later. The first system was deployed to USAREUR and became operational on 12 April 1967. By the end of FY 1968, all of the Mobile HlPAR's for U. S. Army units had been deployed except five, which were delayed by funding and personnel problems in USAREUR.52 The last unit was to have been equipped with the Mobile HIPAR by July 1970; however, two systems were still being held in temporary 53 storage at Seneca Army Depot as of 30 June 1971. One of these was deployed in August 1971. The other was still in depot storage on 8 May 1972, awaiting call from the user.54

The AN/MPQ-T1 Simulator Station

(U) Concurrently with the rapid advancements in HERCULES system capabilities, a comprehensive updating program was in progress at Aircraft Armaments, Inc., to give the AN/MPP-36 simulator Basic and Improved HERCULES capabilities. As an interim measure, ITT modified 10 of the AN/MPQ-36 devices for use in live ASP firings.55 Work on the 10 modified training devices was completed during the first half of FY 1963, with eight of them being allocated to McGregor Range and the other two to U. S. units in Alaska. The updated AN/MPQ-36 device was designated as the AN/MPQ-T1 Simulator Station.56

(U) Parallel with the AN/MPQ-36 updating program, Aircraft Armaments, Inc., designed a new automatic test set (the AN/MPM-55) for field maintenance of the simulator. The contractor completed breadboard models of the AN/HPO-T1 simulator and AN/MPM-55 test

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Assembly & Description of the Mobile HIPAR System


The Mobile HERCULES HIPAR System consisted of three vans mounted on trailers, one antenna trailer, and a power plant trailer.

The antenna trailer, in the march order configuration, was 502 1/4 inches long, 116 inches wide, and 132 inches high. During assembly of the antenna, eight reflector panels were removed from the trailer and attached to a folding center section. The emplaced antenna reflector was 43 feet wide and 14 feet high. The fan pattern reflector could be easily converted into a cosecant squared beam pattern reflector by attaching five additional antenna sections to the top of the fan beam antenna and exchanging the feed horn assembly. For transit, these sections were stored on the deck and goose neck of the receiver trailer. The cosecant squared antenna reflector was the same size as the fixed antenna: 43 feet wide and 25 feet high. The base of either the fan beam or the cosecant squared reflector was 12 feet above the ground level in emplaced conditions.

Each van was 246 inches long, 108 inches wide, and 90 inches high. The maximum height of each mounted van was 132 inches. The electronic equipment, located in each van, was identical to and mounted in the same type cabinets as the HIPAR equipment on fixed sites.

Each van trailer was 502 1/4 inches long and 116 inches wide. The prime mover used was the 5-ten tractor, 6 x 6, M52 or M52A1.

The power plant vehicle was the same basic semitrailer with a small van containing switch gear, protective devices, and the power generation equipment. Two lightweight 200-KW 60-cycle diesel generators were the major power source. Either diesel generator would support the basic power load under normal conditions. A 60-KW 60/400-cycle motor generator set furnished power for the IFC area. The power van would also act as a distribution center for commercial 60-cycle power should a commercial source be available. The vehicle contained a 24-hour fuel supply in the tank of the two diesels, and either engine could operate from the other or from an off-vehicle supply. The power plant was 502 1/4 inches long, 116 inches wide, and 127 7/8 inches tall, and weighed 56,000 pounds .

SOURCE: Fact Sheet, Mobile HERCULES HIPAR System.

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set in March 1963. Following functional tests for compatibility with the Basic HERCULES and Improved HERCULES with HIPAR, procurement go-ahead was granted on the T1 simulator but withheld on the M55 test set pending completion of a feasibility study on possible cancellation of the program.57 Since the AN/MPM-52 field maintenance test set, which was already deployed, could be modified to provide support capability for the T1 simulator, the HERCULES Project Manager, in July 1963, decided against production of the AN/MPM-55 test set. Development of the M55 was completed, however, and the two prototypes already built were used for factory test of the T1 simulator. The decision to cancel the M55 program resulted in a savings of at least $6 million and eliminated one specialized item of test equipment.58

(U) The AN/MPQ-T1 Simulator Station was classified LP in April 1964. By the end of that fiscal year, contracts had been awarded for production of 108 units. In addition to 52 Tl's produced by the developer (including two prototypes), 56 were competitively procured from the Bendix Corporation.59 Integrated engineering-service tests of the T1 simulator were completed in September 1965. Production deliveries commenced in March and continued into December 1966. Issuance to tactical units began in May 1966, enabling the troops to train on their own site in an environment similar to a tactical engagement. Classified as Standard A in June 1966, the AN/MPQ-T1 training device could simulate six targets, several types of ECM, chaff, passive interference, and masking to the Basic and Improved HERCULES systems. Distribution of the simulator station was completed in January 1967.60 Subsequent product improvements were developed to keep the simulator station abreast of advancing HERCULES capabilities. Among these were simulation capabilities for improved ECM. Mark X/XII Selective Identification Features, and an ATBM target generator.61

Maintenance of HERCULES Capabilities

(U) With the "keep ahead" design policy adopted early in the HERCULES program, the system's defensive capabilities kept pace with the advancing air threat of the 1960's through the addition of "black boxes" to the basic system ground equipment. Looking to the future of the HERCULES, however, MICOM recognized that considerable additional development and engineering effort would be essential to keep the system abreast of the expected threat during the interval until a replacement system became available. During a conference held at the Combat Developments Command (CDC) Headquarters on 27-28 February 1964, MICOM discussed the future of the HERCULES missile system in the context of three options.

(U) Under Option I, the HERCULES, in effect, would be put in "moth balls," with no further improvements beyond those already underway, such as the Mobile HIPAR and ECCM programs. It provided for a limited amount of supporting type effort costing about $126 million over a l0-year period (FY 1965-74); however, this level of effort would not be sufficient to maintain a defensive capability commensurate with the threat expected through the projected useful life of the system.

(U) Under Option II, modest improvements would be undertaken to keep the system abreast, or hopefully ahead, of the threat during the interval until it was replaced by a follow-on system, such as the AADS-70's.* It would provide for additional capability in the high explosive warhead area, motor area, video display area, and essential ECCM areas. In addition to these improvements, three-dimensional (3-D) battery acquisition radars would be provided to satisfy user requirements. Including the latter, the total estimated cost of Option II over a l0-year period was $242 million.

(U) Under Option III, a quantum jump in system capability would be attempted. It called for an advanced concept. using the 3-D radars and other improvements to provide a defense capability better than that of the existing HERCULES ATBM system but less than that proposed for the AADS-70's (SAM-D). The estimated cost of Option ZII was $266 million. However, since Option III would be an addition to Options I or II, the total program cost would be $400 to $500 million.

(U) Recognizing that development and fielding of a new system would be the best long-term solution, as opposed to adding more and more "black boxes" to the HERCULES, MICOM recommended that Option II be adopted for future program effort and that a study be conducted to determine firm design characteristics and preliminary program definition for the requirements stipulated in Option 111.62 The Department of the Army, on 16 November 1964, concurred in the Option II approach contingent upon a review of the specific tasks to be included in such a program.

(U) The HERCULES Project Office, in cooperation with CDC and ARADCOM personnel, formulated a proposed Maintenance of HERCULES Capabilities (MOHEC) Program. Submitted to AMC on 5 January 1965, the proposed (Option II) program embraced nine tasks together with the required support effort. In a teletype to MICOM on 12 March 1965, OCRD stated that DA approved for study only the ECCM and high explosive warhead tasks proposed in the MOHEC program. Any decision on the remaining tasks would await completion of the SAM-D program evaluation.63

(U) Accordingly, OCRD revised the HERCULES FY 1966 RDTE budget guidance for MOREC from $6.6 million to $3.250.000. The latter guidance was later reduced to $1 million, which DOD deferred.64 In response, the HERCULES Project Manager advised AMC that if no FY 1966 RDTE program authority were received, the Government-contractor team would be phased out, the existing capability which allowed timely reaction to the changing and new threats would be lost, and the HERCULES system would become obsolete within 2 to 3 years. On 7 December 1965, AMC sent the project manager $1 million in FY 1966 RDTE program authority for the approved portion of the MOHEC program.65

(U) Earlier, in November 1965, OCRD asked the project manager for a proposed R&D program which would cope with the advancing threat. Upon receipt of the proposal, OCRD established the HERCULES Extended Life Program, which was to include the proposed ECM, surface-ro-air, and low-altitude improvement studies.66 The DA, in February 1966, authorized a study of three broad areas (ECCM, medium and high-altitude, and low-altitude improvements) to determine the additional capabilities that the HERCULES would require to keep abreast of the air-supported threat through the 1975 timeframe. The end product of this R&D study, conducted by BTL during the period April 1966 to 31 January 1967, was a complete report including the recommended MOHEC program package and its cost effectiveness. An AMC/CDC Task Group met on 21 February 1967 and formulated a program for updating the Improved HERCULES system.67

(U) After considering SAMCAP* and technical assessment study reports, in addition to the BTL report, the task group divided the MOHEC program items into three categories:

  1. Technical Assessment Items, consisting of improved kits for all tactical sites, additional missile delay lines for each battery, and addition of a HIPAR to systems having only the LOPAR.
  2. SAMCAP items which required development effort, but which could be made available in a shorter time than items falling in the integrated development category.
  3. All other items comprising the integrated development program.
The SAMCAP items were listed in a special category because of the urgent need for their development to give the system the capability to overcome existing vulnerabilities. In submitting the task group's report to AMC Headquarters, on 6 April 1967, the Commanding General of MICOM emphasized the critical need for immediate initiation of the above MOHEC program and development of the SAM-D weapon system.68

(U) In May 1967, however, MICOM received word that OCRD had deferred implementation of the MOHEC program until FY 1969. To implement the proposed MOHEC development effort, $7.lmillion in FY 1968 RDTE funds would be required. The AMC RDTE Command Schedule of 6 March 1967 had programmed a minimum of $1 million per year through 1972 for the previously approved portion of the MOHEC program (including SAMCAP) to cope with the changing threat. Since the SAMCAP items were included as part of the total MOHEC program, deferment of the project until FY 1969 reduced the RDTE budget for FY 1968 to zero. In a letter urging the restoration of SAMCAP funds, the Commanding General of MICOM wrote:

(U) The impact of the loss of an RDT&E Program for FY 1968 is of such magnitude to the future of the HERCULES System that I strongly recommend the reinstatement of the $1M RDT&E funds to the FY 1968 HERCULES Program.69
(U) The failure of DA to restore the FY 1968 RDTE funds for continuation of the SAMCAP effort at BTL resulted in the termination of the R&D contract and the transfer of engineering effort to WECo before completion of the design. The dislocations and disruptions caused by this transition of design responsibility, together with the more limited design expertise of the WECo engineering group, significantly increased risks, both technically and timewise, and later contributed to a $1.5 million cost growth on the SAMCAP hardware contract.70

(U) WECo, in FY 1968, completed the construction and evaluation of the first R&D models of SAMCAP items, which included the HIPAR point logic circuit, imageless mixer for the TTR/TRR, multiple pulse for the TRR, ferrite switch for the TRR, and a computer modification. As available funds permitted, work was also continued on other previously approved portions of the program; i.e., the ECCM and low-altitude improvements. The technical development plan for MOHEC, approved for distribution in May 1967, was revised in October 1967. Implementation of the full MOHEC program, however, depended upon the availability of funds in FY 1969.71

(U) After being deferred in FY 1968, funding for the MOHEC program was again requested in the President's budget for FY 1969. When program authority had not been made available by mid FY 1969, the Commanding General of ARADCOM sent a letter to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR) on 25 January 1969, emphasizing the need for improving the HERCULES capabilities to counter the postulated threat through the 1970's. During a meeting held at MICOM on 12-13 February 1969, representatives of ACSFOR, ARADCOM, AMC, and CDC reviewed alternate program approaches and selected modifications considered absolutely essential to improve the effectiveness of the HERCULES system. This scaled-down MOHEC program was presented during the Army Air Defense 8eview at Fort Bliss, Texas, on 1 and 2 April 1969. The Army Vice Chief of Staff then directed the Army Staff to review this reduced funding option.72 Early in FY 1970, ACSFOR advised MICOM that the revised MOHEC program had become a casualty of the reduced Army budget and could not be funded in either FI 1970 or FP 1971.73

(U) With the full MOHEC program thus shelved, major improvements to the HERCULES system were limited to the SAMCAP items. Another closely related modification, completed in FY 1971, was the Anti-Jam Improvement (AJI), the development of which predated the proposed MOHEC program.

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